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Many drivers of polar-region change originate in mid-latitude industrial societies, so public 
perceptions there matter. Building on earlier surveys of U.S. public knowledge and concern, a 
series of New Hampshire state surveys over 2011 to 2015 tracked public knowledge of some 
basic polar facts. Analysis indicates that these facts subjectively fall into two categories: those 
that are or are not directly connected to beliefs about climate change. Responses to climate-
linked factual questions, such as whether Arctic sea ice area has declined compared with 30 
years ago, are politicized as if we were asking for climate-change opinions. Political divisions 
are less apparent with factual questions that do not suggest climate change, such as whether the 
North Pole is on land or sea ice. Only 38 percent of respondents could answer that question 
correctly, and even fewer (30 percent) knew or guessed correctly that melting of Greenland and 
Antarctic land ice, rather than Arctic sea ice, could potentially do the most to raise sea levels. At 
odds with the low levels of factual knowledge, most respondents say they have a moderate 
amount or a great deal of understanding about climate change. A combination of low knowledge 
with high self-assessed understanding characterizes almost half our sample, and correlates with 
political views. The low knowledge/high understanding combination is most prevalent among 
Tea Party supporters, where it reaches 61 percent. It also occurs often (60 percent) among people 
who do not believe climate is changing. These results emphasize that diverse approaches are 











Polar researchers report changes across a wide range of physical, ecological and human systems. 
Physical systems reflect the polar amplification of climate change, manifest through warming air 
and waters, permafrost thaw, reduced Arctic sea ice, ice shelf attrition, and mass loss from the 
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Greenland and West Antarctic Ice Sheets (IPCC 2013). Ecological systems in turn experience 
shortened winter seasons, enhanced hydrological cycles, and northward shifts in vegetation and 
animals, as winning and losing species confront the rapid pace of change (ACIA 2005; Rogers et 
al. 2012; IPCC 2014). Anthropogenic developments such as long-distance contamination, Arctic 
industrialization, growth of transportation and tourism, and large-scale fisheries impact polar-
region ecosystems and social systems as well (e.g., Hamilton 2004). Human communities, 
particularly in the Arctic, cope with physical and ecological transitions alongside economic, 
governance, demographic, health and cultural pressures for rapid social change (Einarsson et al. 
2004; Huntington et al. 2007; Larsen et al. 2015). Physical, ecological and social systems outside 
the polar regions may feel impacts from changes at the poles (Francis and Vavrus 2012; Coumou 
et al. 2015). 
 
Many of the drivers for high-latitude change originate in mid-latitude industrial societies, where 
public perceptions affect support for climate mitigation and other policies. Unfortunately, 
climate change has emerged as one of the most politically-disputed issues among U.S. political 
leaders and public (McCright and Dunlap 2011; Boykoff 2013; Maquardt-Pyatt et al. 2014; 
Hamilton 2014). Climate change beliefs correlate so strongly with ideology that some analysts 
view both as indicators for the same thing (Kahan 2015). Polarization raises formidable barriers 
to science communication, in a pattern Kraft et al. (2015:121) describe as “hyperskepticism 
toward scientific evidence among ideologues.” Evidence of such skepticism appears widely in 
survey research (Gauchat 2012; McCright et al. 2013; Nadelson et al. 2014; Hamilton and Saito 
2015), including surveys about polar topics. 
 
Over the past decade, surveys have been filling in the picture of U.S. public knowledge and 
concern about the polar regions. Analysis of the 2006 and 2010 General Social Survey (GSS; 
Smith 2013) found moderate to high levels of concern about possible problems, and also some 
indications of improving knowledge (Hamilton 2008; Hamilton et al. 2012a). Concern about 
polar problems generally increases with science literacy, but political orientation can modify this 
science-literacy effect (Hamilton et al. 2012b). Public acceptance of some basic climate-related 
facts, such as CO2 concentrations rising, also depends on politics (Hamilton 2012). However, 
certain other climate-related facts, such as definition of the greenhouse effect, appear more 
politically neutral. 
 
This paper presents results from a series of statewide New Hampshire surveys that carried 
questions about polar facts. Several of these questions have been benchmarked by comparison 
with a national survey, or asked repeatedly in New Hampshire. In both cases the response 
patterns show surprising stability. Three of the New Hampshire surveys, conducted in summer 
2014 through winter 2015, also included new polar-geography questions on basic facts that have 
been prominent in scientific and informed media discussions about climate change, but that 
behave neutrally with respect to climate-change beliefs. These factual questions provide a simple 
indicator for knowledge and an objective reflection on respondents’ self-assessed understanding 





Climate change, polar facts and perceptions 
 
In 2006 and again in 2010, before and after the International Polar Year, the GSS carried a “polar 
module” of questions designed by National Science Foundation researchers to assess public 
knowledge and concern. The knowledge items included both a standard battery of 11 science 
literacy questions and a 5-item test of polar knowledge. Respondents’ levels of concern about 
polar impacts of climate change such as melting ice caps, rising sea levels or threatened species, 
and their support for reserving the Antarctic for science instead of opening it for commercial 
development, are positively related to science literacy and polar knowledge (Hamilton 2008; 
Hamilton et al. 2012a). Ideology shows strong effects too: concern about impacts of polar 
climate change, and support for reserving the Antarctic, tend to be lower among conservatives. 
Moreover, ideology modifies the effects of science literacy, so those effects shift from positive 
among liberals and moderates to negative among the most conservative (Hamilton et al. 2012b). 
 
The proposition that ideology or political views can alter or reverse the sign of education or 
information effects on climate beliefs was first tested in an analysis of 2006 GSS polar questions 
(Hamilton 2008), and independently confirmed across many other questions and datasets 
(Hamilton and Keim 2009; Hamilton 2011a; McCright and Dunlap 2011; Kahan 2011; Shao et 
al. 2014) including some non-climate environmental or science topics (Hamilton et al. 2010; 
Hamilton and Safford 2015). Variations in these studies include alternative indicators for 
information (self-reported understanding, education, objectively-tested science literacy or 
numeracy) and ideology (political party, liberal/conservative scales and worldview). The 
widespread discovery of information×politics type interaction effects has made it advisable to 
test for them routinely in environment and science-related survey research, or risk 
mischaracterizing the separate effects of both information and politics. 
 
The five polar knowledge questions asked on the 2006 and 2010 GSS include three items with no 
direct link to what respondents believe about climate change: whether it is true or false that the 
Sun never shines at the South Pole, Inuit live north of the Arctic Circle, or the North Pole is on a 
floating sheet of ice. However, there also are two items that directly invoke climate change: 
whether climate or hunting is more likely to make polar bears become extinct, and whether ice 
caps have grown larger or smaller over the past 25 years. The hypothetical nature of the bears 
question, and the unspecified geography or metric of the ice caps question, together with their 
obvious connections to climate change, complicate interpretation of these items. Responses seem 
partly to reflect what people believe about climate change in general, apart from whatever they 
know about polar regions. 
 
Analyzing data from a 2011 national survey that included more detailed knowledge questions, 
Hamilton (2012) found patterns again suggesting two kinds of facts. Correct answers to some 
questions, such as the definition of greenhouse effect and whether land ice or sea ice could 
potentially contribute more to sea level, appear mostly independent of political or climate-change 
beliefs. Answers to other equally factual questions, however, could be predicted from politics, 
and behave more like climate-change opinions: whether Arctic sea ice declined, atmospheric 
CO2 increased, or humans have recently released more CO2 than volcanoes. Furthermore, the 
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pattern of which wrong answers climate-change doubters prefer for these questions seemed to 
reflect specific memes (such as Arctic ice recovered, or volcanoes emit more CO2) that had been 
publicized in climate-contrarian media. 
 
These divergent responses to climate facts map roughly onto two ideas about science 
communication. The information deficit model posits that people express low concern about 
scientifically-identified problems because they lack information that scientists could provide 
(Burgess et al. 1998). Applied to polar regions, we could assume that people do not know 
enough; therefore scientists, educators or media should make new efforts to inform and engage 
them. The biased assimilation model on the other hand points to evidence that people seek and 
retain information supporting their prejudices, rejecting that which does not (Borick and Rabe 
2010; Corner et al. 2011; McCright and Dunlap 2011). Better educated individuals could be 
particularly effective in doing so, accounting for the widely observed information×politics 
interactions. Motivated skepticism (Taber and Lodge 2006; Kraft et al. 2015), cultural cognition 
(Kahan et al. 2011) and other theoretical concepts have similar themes of information acquisition 
filtered by worldview or pre-existing beliefs. Applied to polar regions, for example, we see some 
people rejecting scientific reports about melting Arctic sea ice, and eager to accept weakly 
founded claims of recovery. 
 
Although information deficit and biased assimilation can be posed as competing hypotheses, 
many studies find evidence for both, such as education and political effects in the same data. It 
seems likely that the relative balance between these processes differs among individuals, and 
also with attributes of the facts themselves. Wrong answers to belief-linked facts such as whether 
Arctic sea ice area has declined show signs of biased assimilation, whereas wrong answers to 




New surveys of polar knowledge 
 
Building on lessons from the 2006, 2010 and 2011 nationwide surveys, in 2011 we began 
experimenting with polar knowledge questions in the Granite State Poll (GSP), which conducts 
landline and cell telephone interviews with random samples of about 500 New Hampshire 
residents four times each year. A few polar questions were added to the GSP’s usual mix of 
voting, opinion and background items. The GSP has proven to be a high-quality and nimble 
research platform, with an ideas-to-data cycle of weeks to months instead of years. GSP results 
become nationally prominent during election years, and have supplied data both for political 
studies (e.g., Scala and Smith 2007) and basic research (e.g., Hamilton and Stampone 2013). 
Response rates average about 25 percent, as calculated by the stringent AAPOR (2006) 
definition 4. Representativeness is definitively tested in elections, where the GSP performs 
competitively. Probability weights calculated by standard GSP methods have been employed 
with all analyses in this paper, making minor adjustments for known design and sampling bias. 
 
Table 1 defines our set of polar and climate-change questions. Several of these were introduced 
in previous studies based on a national survey (sea ice and sea level in Hamilton 2012) or earlier 
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stages of the New Hampshire series (Arctic/weather in Hamilton and Lemcke-Stampone 2014). 
All three questions have now been repeated enough times to form series. In addition, two new 
questions about the North and South Poles were introduced in summer 2014. Together with the 
sea level item they allow construction of a belief-neutral knowledge score. 
 
  <<Table 1 about here>> 
 
Table 1 also defines two standard climate-change questions, shared with many other surveys. 
One asks for self-assessed understanding of climate change. New Hampshire residents express 
high confidence regarding this topic: 52 percent say they understand “a moderate amount,” and 
26 percent “a great deal” (compared with 50 and 22 percent on a 2011 nationwide survey; 
Hamilton 2011b). Another question asks for respondents’ personal beliefs about climate change. 
One choice, “climate change is happening now and caused mainly by human activities,” 
corresponds to the central point of consensus statements by major science organizations (e.g., 
AGU 2013). Fifty-five percent of New Hampshire respondents agree with the scientific 
consensus, compared with 52 percent on a 2011 national survey (Hamilton 2011b; more recent 
national surveys have been a point or two higher). Both national and New Hampshire responses 
to these two climate-change questions appear roughly stable over the past four years. 
 
In interviewing, the order of response choices to all but the question on understanding is rotated 
to avoid possible bias. Probability-weighted percentages, given with the definitions in Table 1, 
reflect the total pool of respondents who were asked each question. 
 
 
Arctic sea ice, weather and sea level 
 
Figure 1 graphs responses to the sea ice, Arctic/weather and sea level questions. Encouragingly, 
70 percent (of 3,149 respondents over six GSP surveys) responded accurately that late-summer 
Arctic sea ice area has been less in recent years compared with 30 years ago. On the hypothetical 
Arctic/weather question, 60 percent (of 4,386 over eight surveys) think that if the Arctic region 
becomes warmer in the future, this will have major effects on the weather where they live. 
 
  <<Figure 1 about here>> 
 
The sea level question asks whether respondents think that Arctic sea ice, the Greenland and 
Antarctic ice sheets, or Himalayan and Alaskan glaciers would do more to raise sea level if they 
melted. Mass calculations establish that Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets, with ultimate 
potential to raise global sea level by more than 70 meters, far exceed the half-meter potential 
from all other ice sheets and glaciers combined (Williams and Hall 1993), or the negligible 
contribution from sea ice. Only 30 percent of our survey respondents know or correctly guess 
this fact, however. Slightly more (32 percent) believe that Arctic sea ice could raise sea level 
more. Almost as many (28 percent) admit that they do not know, but obviously the true fraction 
is at least 70 percent — probably higher, if some correct answers are guesses. Public awareness 
of this basic geographical fact is slight, although the relationship between sea level and the great 
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ice sheets has been a frequent topic in science and informed news media discussions of climate 
change. 
 
Figure 2 plots responses to these three questions, with each data point representing one survey of 
about 500 interviews. Completing all the interviews for each survey takes about one week; points 
are plotted at the median interview date. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals suggest that 
sampling variation could account for the small survey-to-survey differences. The sea ice question 
was also asked on a national survey in 2011 (Hamilton 2012). The national result, plotted with its 
confidence interval at far left, aligns closely with New Hampshire results. 
 
  <<Figure 2 about here>> 
 
Responses to all three questions in Figure 2 appear remarkably steady, given that this period 
spanned two election years with politically divergent outcomes, seasonal weather ranging from 
summer heat to winter cold, the historical-record low Arctic sea ice in September 2012, and the 
northeastern U.S. landfall of Superstorm Sandy in late October 2012 (occurring between our 
October 2012 and February 2013 surveys). Interviewing for February 2015 New Hampshire 
survey took place during blizzards and sub-zero weather. Although there may be minor 
variations associated with interview-day weather, none of the larger events apparently had 
lasting impacts. 
 
The sea ice question is historical and factual, whereas the Arctic/weather question invites 
speculation about the future. The sea level question also looks toward the future, but its answer 
depends not on speculation but uncontroversial physical geography. Sea ice and Arctic/weather 
responses differ visibly by political views, however, whereas sea level responses do not. Figure 
3 plots these three variables by political party, using a four-party scheme that separates self-
identified Tea Party supporters from Democrats, Independents and Republicans. Tea Party 
supporters tend to be more ideological than other groups (Bullock and Hood 2012; Knowles et 
al. 2013; Maxwell and Parent 2012; Maxwell and Parent 2013; Skocpol and Williamson 2012). 
They stand apart from other Republicans in expressing greater skepticism toward science and 
environmental problems (Hamilton and Saito 2015). Such separation is manifest on the polar 
questions in Figures 3A and B. 
 
  <<Figure 3 about here>> 
 
Across six surveys from June 2011 to May 2015, Democrats are most likely and Tea Party 
supporters least likely to agree with scientists that late-summer Arctic sea ice covers less area 
than it did 30 years ago. An even wider partisan gap across eight surveys marks responses on 
whether Arctic warming could affect the weather where they live. Democrats or Independents 
are most likely and Tea Party supporters least likely to think that if the Arctic warms in the 
future, this will have major effects on their weather. Sea level responses in contrast appear closer 
across parties. Although the sea level question is equally basic it represents a different kind of 







The sea ice, Arctic/weather and sea level questions have been asked repeatedly on New 
Hampshire surveys since 2011 or 2012. Recognizing that sea level responses behaved less 
politically than the others, we added two new questions with similar attributes, regarding North 
and South Pole geography, to GSP surveys in summer and fall 2014 and winter 2015. Figure 4 
charts responses about sea level, the North Pole, and the South Pole, along with a polar 
knowledge score defined as the number of answers correct (0 to 3). For internal consistency only 
the summer 2014 to winter 2015 surveys (which also carried the North and South Pole questions) 
are shown in this graphic, so Figure 4A gives slightly different sea level response percentages 
than Figure 1C. Twenty-nine percent in this three-survey subset (compared with 30 percent in 
the seven-survey pool of Figure 1C) answered the sea level question correctly. 
 
  <<Figure 4 about here>> 
 
Knowledge of North and South Pole geography is low. As Figure 4B shows only 38 percent of 
respondents know or guess that the North Pole is characterized by ice a few feet or yards thick, 
floating over a deep ocean. (In reality North Pole ice averages around 2 or 3 meters, above an 
ocean 4,000 meters deep.) An equal proportion believe instead that it is ice more than a mile 
thick, over land. Thus, although 70 percent answered correctly that Arctic sea ice has decreased, 
a mere 38 percent even know that the North Pole is on sea ice, if that is asked separately. 
 
A slightly higher proportion, 46 percent, answered correctly that the South Pole is characterized 
by thick ice (about 2,700 meters) over land (Figure 4C). Given that 38 percent believed the same 
thing about the North Pole, the higher proportion of correct South Pole answers might partly 
reflect a guessing bias toward “thick ice over land.” With both North and South Pole questions 
(as with sea level) there are relatively minor partisan divisions in accuracy. 
 
A fourth bar chart, Figure 4D, graphs the polar knowledge score defined as the number of 
answers correct among these three belief-neutral questions. Only 8 percent managed to answer 
all three correctly, and 25 percent got two out of three. 
 
 
The social bases of polar facts 
 
A longstanding tradition in social-science research (from Van Liere and Dunlap 1980) studies 
“the social bases of environmental concern,” examining how individual characteristics predict 
views on the environment. This approach has been applied to polar questions on three 
nationwide surveys (Hamilton 2008, 2012; Hamilton et al. 2012b). Core findings from social-
bases research have been the dominant roles of education and politics or ideology in shaping 
individual views on a wide range of topics from global to local in scale. In general, respondents 
with higher education tend to express greater levels of concern about environmental problems, 
and more trust in scientists with regard to these issues. Conservative respondents tend to express 




Table 2 applies this approach to polar facts. Coefficients from weighted logistic or linear 
regression describe the effects on respondent accuracy from age, gender, education, political 
party, self-assessed understanding of climate change, and personal belief about climate change. 
An understand×party term tests for possible interactions between self-assessed information and 
politics. To adjust for otherwise unexplained survey-to-survey variation, intercept dummy 
variables representing individual surveys are included in each model, but omitted for simplicity 
in Table 2. Most of the survey terms are not statistically significant. 
 
  <<Table 2 about here>> 
 
The distinction between polar facts that subjectively are linked to respondent political beliefs 
(sea ice and Arctic/weather), and others that are not (sea level, North and South Poles) stands out 
clearly in Table 2. Personal belief in anthropogenic climate change significantly predicts both sea 
ice and Arctic/weather responses (p < .001), but none of the others. Similarly, the 
understand×party interaction predicts sea ice and Arctic/weather but no others. Political party 
exhibits a significant main effect only on Arctic/weather, which means (given the coding used 
here) that party affects Arctic/weather responses even among those who say they have little 
understanding of climate change (understand = 0). 
 
Self-assessed understanding of climate change significantly predicts accurate responses to all of 
the polar facts questions. As one might hope, individuals with more confidence in their 
understanding do seem to know more. Education also raises the odds of answering the sea level 
or North Pole items correctly. Older respondents less often know South Pole geography. The less 
political questions all show significant gender effects, often reflecting higher proportions of 
“don’t know” responses by women. These patterns suggest that an information-deficit model 
partly explains the right and wrong answers to all questions. At the same time, the party, climate 
and understand×party effects on sea ice and Arctic/weather responses suggest that biased 
assimilation or biased guessing come into play on those two questions. 
 
The significant understand×party interaction effects on belief that Arctic sea ice has declined, 
and Arctic warming would have major effects on your weather, are visualized as adjusted 
marginal plots in Figure 5. Among Democrats, Independents and to some degree Republicans, 
those with higher self-assessed understanding of climate change are more likely to know that sea 
ice has declined. The opposite holds among Tea Party supporters: those with higher self-assessed 
understanding of climate change are less likely to know that sea ice has declined (Figure 5A). 
This interaction affecting an uncontroversial physical observation parallels similar interactions 
observed elsewhere with a wide range of climate belief measures, reinforcing the conclusion that 
sea ice responses behave as if they were climate-change opinions. 
 
  <<Figure 5 about here>> 
 
Figure 5B graphs a similar interaction affecting whether people think that if the Arctic warms in 
the future, that will have major effects on their weather. The science is not settled on whether 
recent Arctic warming has measurably affected mid-latitude weather already (Francis and 
Vavrus 2012; Coumou et al. 2015), but there is broad agreement that future changes to albedo, 
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sea ice formation and other processes will have global consequences (IPCC 2013, 2014). Among 
Democrats, Independents and Republicans, the probability of a “major effects” response rises 
with self-assessed understanding. But Tea Party supporters who say they understand a great deal 
about climate change are least likely to think Arctic warming could have major effects on their 
weather. Curves similar in shape to those in Figure 5, suggesting “understanding” based on 
biased assimilation, have been seen in other survey datasets as well (Hamilton 2011a; McCright 
and Dunlap 2011). 
 
 
“Understanding” and knowledge 
 
Our surveys find a paradoxical combination of high self-assessed understanding of climate 
change with generally low knowledge of basic facts. The polar questions are by no means a 
broad test of climate knowledge, but they involve background information that anyone 
moderately well informed about climate should know. Both scientific and public discussions 
have emphasized Arctic sea ice decline as a major symptom of change. Sea level rise, depending 
on the future of the great ice sheets, also has been a major and publicly dramatic point in climate-
change discussions. Someone paying little attention to the issue might have less reason to know 
North from South Pole, but anyone who is paying attention should have seen them discussed 
repeatedly. Moreover, awareness of geography or the sea/land ice distinction, unlike other basic 
facts such as ice decline, is demonstrably unrelated to respondents’ politics or climate-change 
beliefs. A polar knowledge score defined as the number of correct answers among sea level, 
North Pole and South Pole questions thus provides a limited but analytically useful marker for 
knowledge. 
 
Table 3 cross-tabulates dichotomized versions of the polar knowledge and understanding 
variables. Twenty percent of our respondents report having little or no understanding of climate 
change, and answer one or none of the polar questions correctly. This realistically humble and 
low-information group might benefit from science communicated in accessible, innovative ways 
outside the classroom — for example, through game-based learning (Wu and Lee 2015) or 
providing information about the level of agreement among scientists, countering the false 
impression of balance that may be fostered by media practices (Boykoff 2013). 
 
  <<Table 3 about here>>> 
 
Also realistic, to the extent tested here, are the 29 percent who report moderate or high 
understanding, and get two or three answers correct. These people more likely pay attention to 
science, and might benefit from further information including new research. Only a few, four 
percent, claim little or no understanding but nevertheless got two or three answers correct. This 
group may include lucky guessers along with some who know the answers but are modest. 
 
An impressive 47 percent of respondents fall into the overconfident fourth group, claiming 
moderate to high understanding of climate change but unable to answer more than one polar 
question correctly. Their sense of understanding evidently derives from sources other than 
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knowledge about the physical world. Who are these people? Figure 6 breaks down the percent 
overconfident by age, gender, education, political party and personal belief about climate change. 
 
  <<Figure 6 about here>> 
 
Unlike polar knowledge itself, overconfidence appears unrelated to age (p = .12) or gender (p = 
.47). Overconfidence is somewhat more prevalent among respondents with postgraduate 
education (p < .05). Larger differences occur by political party and climate-change beliefs (p < 
.001). Democrats, Independents and Republicans appear roughly similar (41 to 47 percent), 
whereas Tea Party supporters are significantly more likely (61 percent) to combine high self-
assessed understanding with low knowledge. Likewise, the rates of overconfidence among those 
who think climate is changing due to human activities or natural forces are similar, both about 48 
percent. But a significantly higher fraction (60 percent) among those who think climate change is 
not happening exhibit that combination of high understanding with low knowledge. These 
patterns suggest that the false sense of understanding has ideological roots. 
 
To be fair, overconfidence is quite prevalent, above 40 percent, among other groups too. Many 
of those people no doubt also derive a false sense of understanding about climate from their own 
ideological perspective. The comparisons in Figure 6 simply highlight where ideology-based 





In the eyes of survey respondents there seem to be two kinds of polar facts. Some, like the sea 
ice/land ice distinction, or North and South Pole geography, have no obvious connection to and 
cannot be guessed from ideological beliefs. Despite the basic nature of our questions, and their 
multiple-choice format, only a third of the respondents could answer more than one correctly. 
Although such facts cannot be inferred from personal climate-change beliefs, they have been 
prominent in scientific and news media discussions about climate, and so are here viewed as a 
very rough but neutral indicator for knowledge. 
 
Another kind of fact, though equally real in the physical world, evokes a different survey 
response. These are facts like Arctic ice decline that have more obvious connections to climate 
change. Non-polar examples include atmospheric CO2 increase, and whether humans or 
volcanoes have recently emitted more CO2 (Hamilton 2012). Responses to such questions 
behave as if we are asking for people’s climate-change opinions, which have become acutely 
politicized (Hamilton 2011a; Leiserowitz et al. 2011; McCright and Dunlap 2011, 2014; 
Marquardt-Pyatt et al. 2014; Hamilton and Saito 2015) to the extent they serve as ideological or 
cultural markers (Kahan et al. 2011). Put another way, many people are rejecting (or probably in 
some cases accepting) basic facts depending on whether they fit pre-existing beliefs — biased 
assimilation in action. From a scientist’s standpoint it might seem justified to construct a climate-
knowledge scale using the preponderance of change-supporting facts. Such a knowledge scale 
would certainly predict individual belief in anthropogenic warming. Interpretation of that 
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relationship would be complicated, however, by its subjectively tautological component. 
Acceptance/rejection of those facts in the first place is partly determined by people’s beliefs. 
 
Alternatively, a climate-knowledge scale might be constructed with a deliberate balance of 
questions that intuitively appeal to opposing climate-change beliefs (e.g., Kahan 2015). For 
example, instead of asking about late-summer Arctic sea ice compared with 30 years ago 
(falling), we might ask about midwinter Antarctic sea ice compared with 10 years ago (rising). 
Facts can be selected to form “gotcha” questions in either direction. The meaning and correlates 
of such an offsetting-bias scale would be controlled by the mix of questions selected by the 
researcher, however, limiting its interpretation. 
 
Our simpler, neutral polar-knowledge scale bypasses this limitation and thus offers a different 
window on biased assimilation. Biased assimilation occurs among people of all persuasions 
(Taber and Lodge 2006; Kraft et al. 2015), but that does not mean it is equally prevalent. Table 3 
identifies a large segment, almost half our respondents, who combine high self-assessed 
understanding of climate change with low factual knowledge. Figure 6 shows that this 
combination occurs most often among Tea Party supporters, and those who do not believe 
climate is changing. 
 
Previous studies found that Tea Party supporters report the highest levels of understanding about 
climate change (Leiserowitz et al. 2011; Hamilton and Saito 2015). That applies to the 2014–
2015 surveys pooled in Figure 6 as well: 43 percent of Tea Party supporters, compared with just 
18 percent of Republicans, 21 percent of Independents, and 31 percent of Democrats say they 
have “a great deal” of understanding about climate change. Their polar knowledge scores, on the 
other hand, point in an opposite direction: only 27 percent of Tea Party supporters, compared 
with 31 percent of Republicans or Independents, and 39 percent of Democrats, answered two or 
three questions correctly. More directly than previous studies, these results support the 
conclusion that Tea Party supporters’ sense of understanding about climate change 
disproportionately reflects ideology rather than science knowledge. 
 
With both information-deficit and biased-assimilation processes at work, no science 
communication strategy will reach everyone. This analysis supports a common-sense view that 
we need a mix of approaches to address people with different combinations of information needs 
and receptiveness. Communicating the strength of scientific consensus (Ding et al. 2011; 
Maibach et al. 2014; Van der Linden et al. 2014) might be most helpful as a heuristic for those 
without much science knowledge or strong preconceptions. More detailed information including 
science-based perspective on counter-arguments could help those with some science knowledge 
already, and openness to learn more. Certain websites (such as RealClimate.org or 
SkepticalScience.com) do this well, as do outreach-engaged scientists communicating through 
varied media from conventional news reports and op-eds to videos and science cafes. To make 
inroads against the hyperskepticism among ideologues noted by Kraft et al. (2015), more 
culturally-tailored approaches (Kahan 2015) probably are needed. Ongoing polar changes give 
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Table 1: Polar questions carried on selected Granite State Polls, spring 2010 to spring 2015. Total number of surveys 
and interviews for each question are given in brackets. Interviewers rotated the order of response choices for all 




Seaice — Which of the following three statements do you think is more accurate? Over the past few years, the ice on 
the Arctic Ocean in late summer ... [6 surveys, n = 3,149] 
 Covers less area than it did 30 years ago  (1, 70%) 
 Declined but then recovered to about the same area it had 30 years ago  (0, 11%) 
 Covers more area than it did 30 years ago  (0, 8%) 
 Don’t know/no answer  (0, 11%) 
 
Arcweath — If the Arctic region becomes warmer in the future, do you think that will have ... [8 surveys, n = 4,386] 
 No effects on the weather where you live?  (0, 6%) 
 Minor effects on the weather where you live?  (0, 29%) 
 Major effects on the weather where you live?  (1, 60%) 
 Don’t know/no answer (0, 6%) 
 
Sealevel — Which of the following possible changes would, if it happened, do the most to raise sea levels? [7 
surveys, n = 3,882] 
 Melting of land ice in Greenland and the Antarctic  (1, 30%) 
 Melting of glaciers in the Himalaya and Alaska  (0, 11%) 
 Melting of sea ice on the Arctic Ocean  (0, 32%) 
 don’t know/no answer (0, 28%) 
 
Northpole — Which of these best describes the North Pole? [3 surveys, n = 1,570] 
 Ice a few feet or yards thick, floating over a deep ocean  (1, 38%) 
 Ice more than a mile thick, over land  (0, 38%) 
 A mainly rocky, mountainous landscape  (0, 6%) 
 Don’t know/no answer (0, 17%) 
 
Southpole — Which of these best describes the South Pole? [3 surveys, n = 1,570] 
 Ice a few feet or yards thick, floating over a deep ocean  (0, 19%) 
 Ice more than a mile thick, over land  (1, 46%) 
 A mainly rocky, mountainous landscape  (0, 13%) 
 Don’t know/no answer (0, 21%) 
 
Poleknow — Number of correct answers to sealevel, northpole and southpole. Coded 0 (27%), 1 (40%), 2 (25%) or 3 
(8%). [3 surveys, n = 1,570] 
 
Understand — How much do you feel you understand about the issue of global warming or climate change? [21 
surveys, n = 11,548] 
 A great deal  (2, 26%) 
 A moderate amount  (1, 52%) 
 Only a little  (0, 18%) 
 Nothing at all/no answer  (–1, 4%) 
 
Climate — Which of the following three statements do you personally believe? [21 surveys, n = 11,548] 
 Climate change is happening now, caused mainly by human activities  (1, 55%)  
 Climate change is happening now, but caused mainly by natural forces  (0, 34%)  
 Climate change is NOT happening now  (0, 6%) 
 Don’t know/no answer  (0, 5%) 
 
Overcon — Overconfidence, coded 1 (47%) for respondents having both a low polar-facts score (poleknow 0 or 1) 
and high self-assessed understanding of climate change (understand “moderate amount” or “a great deal”). Coded 0 






Table 2: Coefficients from weighted linear (polar knowledge) or logistic (all others) regression of polar question 
responses (Table 1) on age, gender, education, political party, self-assessed understanding of climate change, 
understand×party interaction, and personal belief that humans are changing the climate. All models include 




        Dependent variable 
 
    Sea  Arctic/ Sea  North  South Polar 
Predictor   Ice  weather level  Pole  Pole  knowledge  
  
Age    –0.003 –0.001 –0.005 –0.001 –0.013b –0.004a  
 
Female   –0.218 0.130  –0.353c –0.695c –0.692c –0.386c  
 
Education   0.181b –0.017 0.093a 0.176a 0.120  0.057 
 
Party    –0.090 –0.176b –0.015 –0.163 –0.106 –0.051 
 
Understand   0.287b 0.333c 0.281c 0.297b 0.274b 0.174c  
 
Understand×Party –0.238c –0.196c –0.093 –0.041 0.050  –0.046 
 




number of surveys 6  8  7  3  3  3 
 
estimation sample 2,906  4,056  3,577  1,423  1,423  1,423 
  
 





Table 3: Cross-tabulation of polar knowledge score by self-assessed understanding of climate 




     Self-assessed understanding  
Polar knowledge 
  score    None or little  Moderate or great  all  
 
Low (0–1)   20   47    67 
 












Figure 1: Response to questions about Arctic sea ice area (A), Arctic warming effects on your 




Figure 2: Percent choosing “Arctic sea ice area less,” “Arctic warming would have major effects 





Figure 3: Percent choosing “ice area less” (A), “major effects on weather” (B), or 




Figure 4: Response to questions about sea level (A), North Pole geography (B), South Pole 
geography (C), and polar knowledge score — number of answers correct (D). Results shown 




Figure 5: Predicted probability of choosing “ice area less” (A) or “major effects on weather” 
(B), as a function of political party and self-assessed understanding of climate change. Adjusted 




Figure 6: Percentage of overconfident respondents, or those reporting moderate/great 
understanding but having low knowledge scores. Probabilities are from design-based F tests. 
 
